In the Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein argues that words do not pick out particular things in the world, but rather, develop meaning according to how they are used. Meaning, for Wittgenstein, is a function of the role a word plays in a particular context, not an absolute correspondence between signifier and signified. He describes the production of such meaningful operations as a “language game” and provides the example of a game constructed by a builder and his assistant. The two communicate through a series of short exclamations: “Block!” “Pillar!” “Slab!” “Beam!” In the context of this usage, such one-word phrases don’t simply name objects; they call for actions to be taken (Hand me the block! Lower the slab!).

One might also wonder whether objects aren't also enmeshed in such networks of situational meaning (how X is used within the context of game Y), or at least, that's the sort of thing I like to wonder about. In addition to their visual slabbiness (somewhat akin to miniaturized trilithic monuments), several of the forms included in the Ludwig series engage in a kind of Wittgensteinian play with the idea of a chair or functional object. Each piece is finished on all sides, allowing for the possibility of inverting a work to position it in a new way and, thus, to achieve an alternate affordance: a bench becomes a bookcase, a side table serves as a record rack, an armchair begs for clarification as to whether it is a "chair," or perhaps, something more like a stool with arms?